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Abstract: This study estimates the impact of income remittances on poverty rates by estimating 
household income under the counter-factual scenario that migration does not occur. Estimation 
of the counter-factual is performed at the national level, as well as across two separate sub-
national groupings of states, first according to historical migration patterns, then according to 
current migration intensity. Findings indicate that the ability of remittances to reduce poverty 
levels varies between groups, and across differing poverty thresholds. I find that remittances 
generally tend to reduce poverty in recipient communities. However, in some cases, I find that 
remittances lead to an increase in the poverty rate. 
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I. Introduction 
 Workers remittances to Mexico have grown from $3.7 billion in 1995 to $21 billion in 
2010 (Banco de Mexico, 2012). Worldwide it is estimated that remittance flows to developing 
countries exceed $300 billion annually. Although some suggest income remittances might be 
superior to traditional forms of development finance (Toxopeus and Lensink, 2007; Ratha, 
2003), researchers are still evaluating the true impact of remittances on recipient countries. 
Research into the impact of remittances on economic development has looked at how 
remittances affect growth through investment in physical capital, human capital, and financial 
development (Adams et al., 2005; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2005), how remittances affect 
income distribution (Barham and Boucher, 1998) and how remittances affect exchange rates 
(Lartey et al., 2008). Several studies find that remittances reduce poverty in the recipient country 
(for example, Wouterse, 2010; Nguyen, 2008; Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2010). One particular 
study by Acosta et al. (2008) looks directly at the effect of remittances on poverty rates in Latin 
America by using nationally representative household survey data to predict household income 
under the counterfactual scenario of households choosing to not send a member abroad. In most 
instances they find remittances to have a positive impact on poverty reduction, with one 
interesting exception: Mexico. In the case of Mexico, they find remittances actually increase the 
poverty rates. This is of particular interest because of the fact that Mexico is by far the largest 
recipient of remittances in Latin America (World Bank, 2010). Given the size of remittance 
flows to Mexico, such a counterintuitive result merits further study. 
 The aim of this study is to further explore the relationship between remittances and 
poverty in Mexico. Acosta et al. (2008) note that the estimated increase in poverty may be due to 
overestimating the potential earnings of the migrant had they remained behind. That is, if 
migration was motivated by unobserved negative economic factors, such as persistent 
unemployment or crop failure, then the true “potential income” prior to migration would be 
lower than that predicted by the counterfactual scenario. Indeed, in 2002, the year of their data 
set, Mexico’s economy was in recession for the second year in a row. However, it may well be 
that there are other factors that determine whether remittances decrease or increase the poverty 
rate. Mexico is a large and rather diverse country, both in terms of geography and demography, 
but also in terms of migratory history. Thus, it is likely that the aggregate approach employed by 
Acosta et al. (2008) misses the nuances created through this heterogeneity. This study exploits 
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that heterogeneity by dividing Mexican states across two different dimensions. First, I group 
states according to geographical regions as defined by the Mexican National Population Council 
(CONAPO). Then, I group states according to an index of migration intensity, also defined by 
CONAPO. I also examine the changes in poverty rates at six different poverty thresholds. 
Following Acosta, et al. (2008), I first measure the effects on the poverty rates using the two 
international lines of moderate and extreme poverty at $2 PPP and $1.25 PPP per day, 
respectively. Importantly, I also measure the effect on poverty at Mexico’s nationally defined 
moderate and extreme poverty lines, for both rural and urban households.  My findings indicate 
that remittances are an effective tool for reducing poverty in most cases. However, the poverty-
reducing effect varies widely among regions and declines as the poverty threshold increases. 
Furthermore, at the highest threshold, the urban moderate poverty line, remittances actually 
increase poverty in the majority of cases. From a policy perspective, these results indicate that in 
order to effectively leverage migration and remittances as a tool for poverty reduction it may be 
beneficial to encourage migration among the populations where the marginal benefit is higher, 
and discourage migration where the benefit is low, or, in some cases, negative. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the data used in the 
empirical procedure, and discusses the relationship between remittances, the income distribution, 
and the geographic regions examined in this study. Section III discusses the empirical methods 
used to estimate the counter-factual poverty rates. Section IV discusses the results, and Section V 
concludes.  
 
II. Data 
 II.I. Household Survey 
 The data used for this analysis come from the 2010 Mexican National Survey of 
Household Income and Expenditures (Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares, 
ENIGH 2010) and the National Population Council (Consejo Nacional de Poblacion, CONAPO). 
ENIGH is a nationally representative survey that collects information on numerous aspects 
pertaining to the household such as income and employment, education, health expenditures, 
living conditions, and demographics. Since 1992, ENIGH has been conducted at regular biennial 
intervals. Acosta et al. (2008) use the 2002 survey. At the time of writing, the 2010 survey is the 
most recent data available.  
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There are 26,833 observations in the 2010 survey for which complete data are available. 
The data are frequency weighted to represent over 28 million households. Table 1 provides 
summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical procedure. Approximately 4.8% of the 
households report receiving “income earned in another country,” which is interpreted to be 
remittance income. It is also assumed that the person(s) sending the remittances is not included 
as a member of the household in the survey. This is due to the fact that although 4.8 percent of 
the households report receiving remittances, only 1.4 percent of the individuals surveyed 
reported living outside of Mexico within the last five years. The average remittance-receiving 
household reports receiving monthly remittances of 805 pesos (US$64)2 per capita. For the 
average remittance-receiving household, remittances account for 35 percent of per capita 
income. The mean total reported income (including remittance income) among these households 
is 2793 pesos (US$221) per month. This is considerably lower than the mean income of 3889 
pesos (US$308) reported by households not receiving remittances.  
 With the exception of income, migrant and non-migrant households are remarkably 
similar. Migrant households are slightly larger with an average of 4.05 members (excluding any 
members living abroad), compared to 3.90 members for non-migrant households.  The primary 
contributors to this difference are children under the age of sixteen. The mean number of adult 
males and females are identical across both groups. Non-migrant households are slightly more 
educated, but the average adult education for both migrant households and non-migrant 
households is between 9 and 10 years. The two groups are also nearly identical in terms of ability 
to read and write in Spanish, and whether the household head speaks an indigenous language.  
 
II.II. Remittance-receiving households by income, region, and migration intensity  
 The ability of remittances to affect poverty rates depends greatly on which households 
are receiving the remittances. Remittance-receiving households have, on average, lower incomes 
than their counterparts not receiving remittances.  However, there is large variation in the 
incomes within the remittance-receiving population. Table 2 reports the share distribution of 
remittance receiving households by income. Ten percent of households receiving remittances are 
in the lowest income decile, with incomes below 499 pesos per month. The poverty line of $2 
2 Pesos are converted using the average official exchange rate for 2010 of $1=12.636 pesos (World Bank, 2012). 
Estimation of the empirical model is conducted using pesos. 
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PPP per day is approximately 475 pesos per month. Thus, all households living below the 
international moderate and extreme poverty lines are in this income decile. Twelve percent of 
remittance-receiving households are in the second income decile, with incomes between 499 and 
819 pesos (US$39-65) per month. Mexico’s extreme poverty line for rural households falls in 
this income decile. The third income decile, with incomes between 819 and 1151 pesos (US$65-
91) per month, contains 12.5 percent of the remittance receiving households. Mexico’s extreme 
poverty line for urban households, 990.77 pesos (US$78), falls in this income decile. The 
moderate poverty line for rural households, 1348.62 pesos (US$107), falls in the fourth income 
decile, which also has 13.7 percent of remittance-receiving households. The highest poverty 
threshold used in this study, the moderate poverty line of 2140.05 pesos ($US169) for urban 
households, falls in the sixth income decile. The fifth and sixth income deciles, respectively, hold 
10.4 percent and 10.9 percent of the remittance-receiving households. Collectively, sixty-one 
percent of remittance-receiving households live below the urban moderate poverty line. Beyond 
the sixth decile the share of remittance receiving households gradually declines to 5.63 percent in 
the tenth decile. This pattern of Mexican migrant households largely coming from the lower end 
of the income distribution is consistent with the pattern observed by Acosta et al. (2008) and 
Ibarraran and Lubotsky (2007). This pattern generally holds in the sub-national breakdown of 
states as well. 
 The positions of remittance-receiving households in the income distribution raise several 
issues relating to poverty that must be addressed. First, the fact that sixty-one percent of 
households receiving remittances are in some form of poverty (i.e. below the moderate urban 
poverty line) suggests that the bulk of remittances are flowing toward those households that need 
them the most. However, this breakdown only reports that households are receiving remittances, 
not the size of the remittances. In fact, the average remittance-receiving household in poverty 
receives a per capita remittance of 378 pesos (US$30) per month. The average for households 
above the urban moderate poverty line is 1470 pesos (US$116) per month. Thus, although more 
households below the poverty line receive remittances, the aggregate flow of remittances to poor 
households is less than half the flow to households above the poverty line. 
 Second, the income distribution is based on total income, including remittances. 
Therefore, while sixty-one percent of impoverished households receive remittances—they are 
still in poverty! However, this ignores the counter-factual scenario, which is estimated below. 
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That is, it fails to account for the number of households above the poverty line that would be 
impoverished without remittance income. More than 23,000 remittance-receiving households 
have incomes less than 126 pesos (US$10) per month above the poverty line. Furthermore, it 
ignores the relative well being of households receiving remittances. That is, while households 
may still be in poverty, remittance income could mean the difference between extreme and 
moderate poverty.  
 Finally, while the majority of households receiving remittances are in the lower end of 
the income distribution, these households represent a very small share of the whole population. 
For example, as reported in Table 2, the ten percent of remittance-receiving households in the 
first income decile only account for five percent of the total households in that decile. Thus, any 
benefit received by the poor from remittances will only accrue to a small share of poor 
households.  
 Just as remittance patterns vary across income ranges, they also vary across geographical 
ranges. In the empirical section below I disaggregate the population across two dimensions. The 
first is a regional grouping of states defined by CONAPO according to migratory history (CEFP, 
2004). Figure 1 presents a map of the regional groupings. The Traditional region consists of the 
states of Aguascalientes, Colima, Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán, Nayarit, San Luis 
Potosi, and Zacatecas. The Traditional region has the longest history of migration to the US due 
to the national railroad line which ran through these states and connected to US railroads at the 
border. As shown in Table 2, states in the Traditional region make up 22 percent of the 
population, but account for 45 percent of remittance-receiving households. Nearly ten percent of 
households in these states receive remittances. 
 The Northern region consists of the states of Baja California, Baja California Sur, 
Coahuila, Chihuahua, Nuevo León, Sinaloa, Sonora, and Tamaulipas. Six of these eight states 
share a border with the US. Somewhat surprisingly, only three percent of households in the 
Northern region receive remittances. One possible reason for seeing fewer remittances in the 
Northern region is that these states have higher incomes relative to most other Mexican states 
(INEGI, 2012). Therefore, although these states are closer to the US there is less of a “push 
factor” driving households to seek employment opportunities in the US. As such, the Northern 
region’s 22 percent of Mexican households account for only 15 percent of remittance-receivers.  
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 The Central region, which consists of the states of Distrito Federal, Hidalgo, México, 
Morelos, Puebla, Querétaro, and Tlaxcala, accounts for 33 percent of the Mexico’s population. 
Twenty-one percent of remittance-receiving households reside in the Central region. The Central 
region has traditionally been less a source of out-migration, and more a destination of internal 
migrants heading to Mexico City. Hence, it is not quite as surprising to see that only three 
percent of households in the Central region receive remittances. 
 The final region is the South/Southeast (SSE) region, which consists of the states of 
Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz, and Yucatán. 
Historically, the SSE region has not been a major source of migration to the US because its 
rugged mountain and jungle terrain is not very accommodating to ground transportation. Today, 
however, 19 percent of remittance-receiving households reside in the SSE region.  
 Dividing the states up along these regional lines allows for a more detailed analysis of the 
poverty effects of remittances that may be overlooked in the aggregate. For instance, since the 
Traditional region accounts for such a large share of remittance-receiving households it is likely 
that any effects occurring in this region could be overshadowing the effects occurring in other 
regions. Also, remittances are also likely to affect households in the SSE region differently than 
in other regions since the states in this region contains Mexico’s poorest states and 70 percent of 
remittance-receiving households are considered to be in poverty.  
 In addition to grouping states according to geographic regions, I also disaggregate states 
according to migration intensity. The grouping follows an ordinal ranking of five categories, as 
defined by CONAPO, ranging from Very Low to Very High migration intensity. The 
categorization is based on an index of migration intensity between Mexico and the US, 
constructed in 2010, which is comprised of 1) the share of households that received remittances 
between 2005 and 2010, 2) share of households with members who emigrated to US since 2005, 
3) members who have returned to US since 2005, but emigrated prior to 2005, and 4) households 
with circular migrants, who emigrated and returned between 2005 and 2010 (CONAPO, 2012). 
Figure 2 presents a map of states grouped according to migration intensity.  
Table 3 gives a listing of states by region and their migration intensity ranking. All of the 
Very High intensity states are in the Traditional region with the remaining Traditional region 
states being ranked as High intensity. Of the five remaining High intensity states, three are in the 
Central region and two are in the SSE region. The SSE region has five other states that are 
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ranked as Very Low and one that is ranked Average intensity. The Central region also has two 
states ranked as Average, one ranked Low, and one state ranked Very Low intensity. The 
Northern region has five states ranked as Average intensity, one ranked Low, and two ranked 
Very Low. Thus, grouping by migration intensity provides a significantly different view than 
grouping by geographical regions. The key difference between the two groupings is that the 
geographic regions group states according to historical migration patterns, whereas the grouping 
by migration intensity divides states according to the current state of Mexican migration. 
 
III. Empirical Methodology 
Estimating the poverty effects of remittances can be done, generally, in two ways. The 
first and most basic way is to simply calculate poverty rates based on total household income, 
then on non-remittance income only and compare the two. This calculation, which estimates the 
scenario of migration taking place without remittances, is tantamount to reducing the income of 
remittance recipient households, which would most certainly result in increasing poverty by 
pushing borderline income households below the poverty threshold.  
While the above technique may be attractive due to its simplicity, it fails to account for 
the opportunity costs associated with receiving remittances, in particular foregone wages that 
would have been earned by the migrant. To account for the poverty effects of remittances while 
controlling for lost income, it is necessary to estimate household income under the scenario that 
not only have remittances not taken place, as in the above method, but that migration also has not 
taken place. However, without information on household income prior to migration, it is 
necessary to infer these incomes from the available data. 
The basic framework follows Acosta et al. (2008), and estimates a model in the form:  
 log i i i iY X Hα β γ ε= + + + , (1) 
where iY  is per capita income of household i , iX  is a vector of variables for the demographic 
characteristics of the household, iH  is a vector of characteristics of the household head, and iε is 
an error term. Equation (1) can be estimated using the sub-set of non-remittance receiving 
households and then the coefficient estimates can be used to predict income for remittance-
receiving households under the counterfactual scenario. This method, however, presents two 
additional problems. First, there is no information in the survey regarding the characteristics of 
the person sending the remittances, which causes a problem when trying to predict his income as 
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if he had not migrated. Second, unless the households receiving remittances are randomly 
selected from the pool of households surveyed, estimates of ε will not be independent and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.), and estimates of earnings will be biased. 
To correct for these problems, I follow Acosta et al. (2008) and assume that remittances 
come from a single male adult with the same education level as other adult members of the 
household3. This assumption can be supported by the fact that CONAPO reports 93% of 
migrants to the US are male with a mean age of 34 years old (CEFP, 2004). To correct for the 
potential bias in equation (1), it is estimated using the sample selection correction proposed by 
Heckman (1979). 
Since there is no evidence to support the idea that households in the subset of non-
remittance recipients, whose earnings are to be evaluated by equation (1), are randomly selected 
into that group, it is necessary to add to equation (1) a variable that accounts for a household’s 
propensity to not receive remittances, ( *iM ). This is achieved by using the following model: 
(Selection equation) 
 * 1 1 1i i i i iM X H Zα β γ ω ν= + + + +  (2) 
(Earnings equation) 
 2 2 2log i i i i iY X Hα β γ θλ µ= + + + + , (3) 
where *iM is an indicator equal to one if a household does not receive remittances, and zero if the 
household does receive remittances. iZ is a vector of variables that influence one’s decision to 
migrate, but that have no effect on earnings. To make the results comparable, the  elements of iZ  
are the same as those in Acosta et al. (2008) and include the percentage of households receiving 
remittances in the community (as a proxy for existence of migrant networks, and therefore a 
measure of ease of resettling), an index of household assets, and their interaction term. Both 
equations also include state dummy variables to control for state-level fixed effects. The term iλ  
is the inverse Mills’ ratio, defined as 
 1 1
1 1
( )
1 ( )
i i i
i
i i i
X H Z
X H Z
φ α β γ ωλ
α β γ ω
+ + +
=
−Φ + + +
 (4) 
3 Acosta et al. (2008) note that this may be a conservative estimate for the number of migrants since Haitian and 
Nicaraguan households report having, respectively, 2.2 and 1.8 adult migrants living abroad (p. 99). 
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where ( )φ •  and ( )Φ •  are, respectively, the probability density function and cumulative density 
function of the argument ( )i i iX H Zα β γ ω+ + + . If iλ  is a significant predictor of earnings, it 
would suggest that there is indeed a correlation between the decision to migrate and earnings 
and, thus, estimates of equation (1) would be biased. Controlling for iλ  allows the error term in 
(2), iµ , to have the desirable i.i.d properties. 
Once coefficient estimates are obtained for (3), I calculate predicted values of iλ for the 
remittance receiving households, then estimate the predicted income, iˆY , for the entire sample. 
To account for the migrant that is absent from remittance-receiving households, I increase the 
total household size by one member by adding one male aged 16 to 65. However, as noted by 
Acosta et al. (2008), these calculations fail to account for unobserved determinants of income, 
and therefore a random error term is added to each observation. Predicted income is then 
estimated, and poverty rates are calculated at the six different income thresholds. The process is 
repeated 1,000 times to allow for calculation of 95% confidence intervals. 
Whereas Acosta et al. (2008) estimate the model only at the national level, this study also 
estimates the model on all nine of the sub-national groupings. Additionally, this study differs 
from Acosta et al. (2008) by using the Maximum Likelihood method to estimate the model, 
which is a more efficient estimator than the Two-step method. This study also utilizes the 
frequency weights in estimating the poverty rates, whereas the previous study did not. 
 
IV. Results 
 For comparison purposes, Tables 4a and 4b present coefficient estimates of the income 
equation using both the OLS estimator in (1) and the Heckman estimator in (3) for different 
geogrpahical locations. In general, the coefficient estimates are quite similar; in many cases they 
are identical. Only in a few cases do coefficients switch signs. However, the estimates ofθˆ , the 
coefficient of the selection variable iλ , are significant for all models, with the exception of the 
SSE region. Furthermore, a likelihood ratio test for correlation between the error terms of (2) and 
(3) rejects the null hypothesis of independent equations for all cases, with the exception of the 
SSE region. This indicates that there is indeed a correlation between income and the decision to 
migrate, thus controlling for iλ  provides consistent estimators of the income equation 
parameters. 
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 Although the Heckman estimates are very similar to the OLS estimates, they do differ 
across regions and migration intensities. For instance, in the Central and SSE regions, and Low 
and Very High Migration intensity regions, an increase in the number of adolescent males in the 
household decreases per capita income, but in all other regions and at the national level they 
increase per capita household income. Differences across regions and intensities can also be 
found in other ages and genders, education levels, and whether the household head speaks an 
indigenous language.  
Perhaps the more interesting differences across regions and migration intensities are the 
differences in the coefficients for the selection variable iλ . A positive coefficient for iλ indicates 
that an increase in the propensity to select into the group that does not migrate is associated with 
an increase in income. In other words, households that do not choose to send a member abroad 
may do so because they can earn higher incomes in their home community. This is the case in all 
but three regressions: Low, High, and Very High migration intensity regions.  In these three 
cases, the negative coefficient indicates that a lower propensity to migrate is associated with a 
decrease in income. 
Table 5 presents estimates of the non-migration selection equation estimates. There is 
considerable variation in the coefficients of the predictors of whether a household chooses to 
migrate or not, across the geographic regions and migration intensities. The variables that seem 
to make up most of the heterogeneity between regions are the number of adults in the household 
and the education levels of the household members. In states with lower migration intensity, a 
higher number of adults in the household is associated with a lower propensity to migrate, 
whereas in states with higher migration intensities the opposite appears to be true. In the 
Northern and SSE regions, households with higher average education levels are more likely to 
migrate. In the Central and Traditional regions, households with higher average education levels 
are less likely to migrate. 
 
 
Poverty Effects 
 Tables 6a and 6b report the results of the poverty rate estimates under the simplified 
counter-factual scenario of migration, but no remittances, i.e. the poverty rates if households 
relied on non-remittance income only. Each panel corresponds to a different definition of the 
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poverty line. The first column of each panel presents the observed poverty rate at the national 
and sub-national levels. The first column in the first panel of Table 6a, shows that the 4.62% of 
households, at the national level, have incomes that are below the international extreme poverty 
line of $1.25 PPP per day. The second column reports the poverty rates under the simplified 
counter-factual scenario of migration, but no remittances. The third and fourth columns report 
the difference between the observed and counterfactual, both in level terms and as a percentage 
change. As expected, the negative signs indicate that remittances reduce the poverty rates in all 
cases. This should not come as a surprise, since this counterfactual scenario is essentially nothing 
more than a loss of income. However, this measure does provide some insight into the 
importance of remittances to households, particularly at the very low end of the income 
distribution. For instance, if remittance flows were cut off, the share of households in poverty in 
the Northern region would more than double from 3% to 7.9%.  
 Tables 7a and 7b report the key results of the poverty rate estimates utilizing the imputed 
income under the counter-factual scenario that the migrant remains in his home community and 
contributes to household income. The columns of 7a and 7b are structured the same as the 
columns in 6a and 6b, with the exception that the column reporting the estimated poverty rate 
also reports the 95% confidence intervals of the estimates. At the national level, the first panel 
shows that the estimated share of households living on less than $1.25 (USD PPP) per day, if 
migration had not occurred, is 5.35%. Since this is higher than the observed rate of 4.62%, it can 
be concluded that remittances reduce the extreme poverty rate by 0.73 percentage points. This is 
equivalent to a 14% reduction in the number of households living below the international 
extreme poverty line. Thus, remittances help to lift nearly 200,000 households out of extreme 
poverty. At the international moderate poverty line of $2 (USD PPP), the estimated counter-
factual poverty rate, at the national level, is 10.96%, which is 1.63 percentage points above the 
observed poverty rate at that level. This indicates that remittances lead to a 15% reduction in the 
number of households living with incomes below $2 (USD PPP) per day, nationwide.  
 These two results are opposite of the findings reported by Acosta et al. (2008). As noted 
earlier, the previous study suggests that the poverty-enhancing effect of remittances in the 
Mexican case may be due to overestimation of potential income resulting from negative 
selection. The findings presented in this study lend support to that hypothesis, given the fact that 
the data used in the present study were collected in a year in which the Mexican economy grew 
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by 4.2% per capita. However, the preceding year saw Mexico’s per capita GDP decline by 7.4%, 
the largest contraction in more than a decade (World Bank, 2012). Thus, any inferences made 
between the growth rate and poverty effects of remittances are made with extreme caution.  
 The remaining portions of Tables 7a and 7b report estimates beyond the scope of those 
reported by Acosta et al. (2008).  The effects of remittances on poverty rates vary widely across 
state groupings and poverty lines. At the $2 per day poverty threshold, the Traditional region’s 
results closely resemble the national results, with a 1.66 percentage point reduction in the 
poverty rate, which results in a 15% reduction in the number of households living below the 
poverty line. The largest reductions in poverty across geographic regions occur in the Central 
region, where it is estimated that the poverty rate falls from 9.18% to 7.19%, or 1.99 percentage 
points. The Northern region’s 1.67 percentage point drop is the next largest reduction in poverty. 
Notably, the reductions in poverty are smallest in the most impoverished of the four regions, the 
SSE region, where the observed poverty rate is just over 15%. When broken down by migration 
intensity, the states in the Very High category fare the best at the $2 poverty line, with 
remittances reducing poverty by 3 percentage points. This represents a 24% decline in the 
number of households living on less than $2 per day.  The smallest reduction occurs among 
states in the High migration intensity category, with a 3% reduction in the number of households 
living on less than $2 per day.  
 At the international extreme poverty line of $1.25 per day, the Central region, again, fares 
the best, with a 24% reduction in the number of households living below the poverty line. The 
Traditional region has the smallest reduction in poverty with a decrease of 0.23 percentage 
points. States in the Very Low and Low migration intensity categories have the largest poverty 
reductions among the migration intensity groupings. By contrast, in the High migration intensity 
category, it is estimated that remittances lead to a 7% increase in poverty. This result is 
suggestive of diminishing marginal returns to migration.  
 As the poverty threshold increases to the nationally defined extreme poverty lines, for 
rural and urban households, the percentage point changes typically increase. The largest single 
reduction in poverty occurs in the Low migration intensity states at the rural extreme poverty 
line. It is estimated that remittances reduce poverty by 2.86 percentage points. The second largest 
reduction occurs in the Northern region at the urban extreme poverty line, with a 2.8 percentage 
point decrease. Nationally, it is estimated that remittances lead to a 9.73 percent decrease in the 
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number of households living below the rural extreme poverty line, and a 7.94 percent reduction 
in the number of households living below the urban extreme poverty line. Remittances have the 
smallest effect on households in the SSE region and in states designated as high migration 
intensity, at both measures of the national extreme poverty line. 
 At the nationally defined rural moderate poverty line, remittances reduce poverty by 2.78 
percent, nationwide. Once again, remittances have the largest impact among households in the 
Northern region, with a seven percent reduction in households living below the poverty line. 
However, it appears that the effectiveness of remittances is diminishing, as no other regions or 
intensity groupings have a reduction in poverty that exceeds five percent. Furthermore, in the 
SSE region it is now estimated that poverty rates would be 2.64% lower under the counter-
factual scenario that migration had not occurred, i.e. migration is increasing poverty.   
 At the highest poverty threshold, the urban moderate poverty line, the estimates indicate 
that poverty rate slightly increases with remittances at the national level, from 51.79% before 
migration to 51.98% after migration. This result varies, however, across regions. Poverty 
decreases in the Traditional and Northern regions. Poverty increases in the Central and SSE 
regions. Poverty also increases in states ranked as very low, low, and very high migration 
intensity. The largest increases in poverty occur in the low migration intensity and very high 
migration intensity groups, each with poverty increasing by over two percent. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 Contrary to the results found by Acosta et al. (2008), the results of this study indicate 
that, in general, remittances tend to have a poverty-reducing effect among Mexican households. 
The size of this effect, however, varies greatly depending on the subset of households being 
examined, as well as which measure of poverty is being used. Remittances appear to have the 
largest impact on households at the lowest levels of the income distribution. There are, however, 
other patterns that emerge, which indicate the ability of remittances to lift households out of 
poverty may be limited. First, the overall poverty reduction of households in the Traditional 
region is low compared to the Northern and Central regions. Since nearly half of all remittances 
flow to the Traditional region, a benevolent planner might consider this to be a misallocation of 
resources. Thus, it may be desirable to try to encourage more migration from areas where the 
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poverty reducing effects are high, and discourage migration from areas where the poverty 
reduction is low and/or negative. 
Second, poverty rates are affected least in the SSE region, which is the region where 
poverty is highest. It should be noted, however, that this region was the only area where the 
coefficient on the selection variable was insignificant, which suggests that the choice to migrate 
is unrelated to the household’s earnings potential.  
It is also important to mention that there does not seem to be any indication that states 
with higher migration intensities fare any better than states with lower migration intensities, and 
vice-versa. However, there does appear to be evidence that remittances lose effectiveness at 
reducing poverty at higher poverty thresholds. In fact, in some cases remittances leave 
households worse off than they otherwise would be. There appear to be two key facts 
contributing to this effect. First, the majority of remittance-receiving households are in the lower 
end of the income distribution. Thus, that is where the largest impact is likely to be found. 
Second, as the poverty thresholds increase, the gap between thresholds also increases. Thus, to 
move a household from the edge of extreme poverty beyond the moderate poverty line requires a 
much larger contribution to income at the nationally defined poverty line than it does at the 
international poverty line. Furthermore, there may be opposing incentives between the 
remittance sender and the receiver. It could be the case that remittance income is being used to 
subsidize leisure. If remittance receivers are using the extra income to work fewer hours, the 
sender may be unwilling to send anything beyond the minimum amount necessary to ensure 
basic survival. 
Although this study finds that remittances fall short of moving households beyond the 
nationally defined moderate poverty line, it does present evidence that remittances are effective 
at moving households up the income ladder. While the majority of remittance-receiving 
households still remain in some level of poverty, the fact remains that remittances raise the 
incomes of millions of households. Therefore, it can be reasoned that most of these households 
are better off with remittances than without. The key hurdle to get over will be getting 
households over the final poverty threshold. While this has yet to occur at the national level, it 
does appear to be happening in a number of states. By understanding what separates these states 
from the others, policies can be developed which may assist in utilizing remittances as a tool in 
the fight against poverty. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  
All Households Migrant Households 
Non-Migrant 
Households 
  
(N = 28,295,193) (N = 1,357,999) (N = 26,937,194) 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
loginc Log of HH per capita quarterly income (Pesos) 8.71 1.14 8.51 1.00 8.72 1.15 
pesomonth Per capita monthly income (Pesos) 3835.80 6864.64 2792.63 3979.76 3888.39 6974.44 
nomig Dummy variable = 1 if HH does not receive remittances 0.95 0.21 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
hhsize Size of HH 3.91 2.02 4.05 2.10 3.90 2.02 
child05 # of children aged 0-5 0.42 0.71 0.45 0.72 0.42 0.71 
male615 # of males aged 6-15 0.40 0.68 0.46 0.77 0.40 0.68 
female615 # of females aged 6-15 0.38 0.69 0.43 0.71 0.38 0.69 
male1665 # of males aged 16-65 1.17 0.88 1.17 0.88 1.17 0.88 
female1665 # of females aged 16-65 1.28 0.87 1.28 0.86 1.28 0.87 
avged Average education of adults in HH (years) 9.57 5.33 9.22 5.47 9.59 5.33 
age Age of HH head 48.76 15.81 48.75 15.50 48.76 15.83 
edyrs Years of education of HH head 8.79 6.35 8.53 6.40 8.80 6.35 
hablaind Dummy variable =1 if HH head speaks indigenous language 0.13 0.33 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.33 
alfabe Dummy variable =1 if HH head can read and write Spanish 0.90 0.30 0.88 0.33 0.90 0.30 
assets Principal components asset index 0.06 0.76 0.05 0.77 0.06 0.76 
remshrco Share of households in Municipio receiving remittances 3.46 4.15 5.11 4.99 3.38 4.08 
remshrxassets Assets x Share of households receiving remittances -0.11 4.50 -0.40 6.27 -0.10 4.40 
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Table 2: Remittances by Income Distribution and Region  
 
Population 
 
Total 
 
1st Income Decile (0-499 pesos) 
 
2nd Income Decile (499-819 pesos) 
 
# of 
Households 
Share of 
Households 
 
# of HH 
Receiving 
Remittances 
Share of 
Remittance 
Receivers 
(%) 
Share of 
HH 
Receiving 
Remittances 
(%) 
 
# of HH 
Receiving 
Remittances 
Share of 
Remittance 
Receivers 
(%) 
Share of 
HH 
Receiving 
Remittances 
(%) 
 
# of HH 
Receiving 
Remittances 
Share of 
Remittance 
Receivers 
(%) 
Share of HH 
Receiving 
Remittances 
(%) 
National 28295193 100%   1357999 100 4.8   140844 10.37 4.97   164915 12.14 5.82 
Traditional Region 6184226 22% 
 
613020 45 9.91 
 
56858 9.28 9.31 
 
72696 11.86 10.95 
Northern Region 6333645 22% 
 
204485 15 3.23 
 
17227 8.42 3.58 
 
25415 12.43 4.68 
Central Region 9262573 33% 
 
282004 21 3.04 
 
28122 9.97 3.96 
 
40753 14.45 4.88 
SSE Region 6514749 23%   258490 19 3.97   38637 14.95 3.76   26051 10.08 3.29 
Very Low Intensity 6663589 24% 
 
139296 10 2.09 
 
15638 11.23 2.4 
 
23071 16.56 3.91 
Low Intensity  4331450 15% 
 
76101 6 1.76 
 
9715 12.77 2.84 
 
10295 13.53 2.62 
Average Intensity 7870651 28% 
 
321980 24 4.09 
 
29489 9.16 4 
 
33940 10.54 4.25 
High Intensity 6588967 23% 
 
505226 37 7.67 
 
55130 10.91 6.99 
 
65178 12.90 9.19 
Very High Intensity 2840536 10%   315396 23 11.1   30872 9.79 9.91   32431 10.28 9.47 
Table 2 cont'd.                             
3rd Income Decile (819-1151 pesos) 
 
4th Income Decile (1151-1550 pesos) 
 
5th Income Decile (1550-2035 pesos) 
 
6th Income Decile (2035-2647 pesos) 
# of HH Receiving 
Remittances 
Share of 
Remittance 
Receivers 
(%) 
Share of 
HH 
Receiving 
Remittances 
(%) 
 
# of HH 
Receiving 
Remittances 
Share of 
Remittance 
Receivers 
(%) 
Share of 
HH 
Receiving 
Remittances 
(%) 
 
# of HH 
Receiving 
Remittances 
Share of 
Remittance 
Receivers 
(%) 
Share of 
HH 
Receiving 
Remittances 
(%) 
 
# of HH 
Receiving 
Remittances 
Share of 
Remittance 
Receivers 
(%) 
Share of HH 
Receiving 
Remittances 
(%) 
169952 12.51 6.02   185478 13.66 6.55   141102 10.39 4.99   148021 10.90 5.23 
68409 11.16 11.76 
 
84162 13.73 13.17 
 
69204 11.29 10.92 
 
71994 11.74 12.37 
24527 11.99 4.65 
 
27913 13.65 4.53 
 
16067 7.86 2.48 
 
28248 13.81 3.9 
28652 10.16 3.14 
 
36873 13.08 3.88 
 
26509 9.40 2.89 
 
28713 10.18 3.09 
48364 18.71 6.01   36530 14.13 5.86   29322 11.34 4.65   19066 7.38 3.21 
13870 9.96 2.42 
 
20536 14.74 3.24 
 
14380 10.32 2.26 
 
14804 10.63 2.26 
10470 13.76 2.34 
 
5985 7.86 1.29 
 
6369 8.37 1.34 
 
5560 7.31 1.27 
46101 14.32 5.59 
 
51463 15.98 6.74 
 
32606 10.13 4.22 
 
30811 9.57 3.57 
59245 11.73 8.77 
 
66805 13.22 10.83 
 
50511 10.00 7.91 
 
62587 12.39 10.19 
40266 12.77 13.26   40689 12.90 11.6   37236 11.81 12.07   34259 10.86 13.13 
Table 2 cont'd.                             
7th Income Decile (2647-3579 pesos) 
 
8th Income Decile (3579-5072 pesos) 
 
9th Income Decile (5072-8492 pesos) 
 
10th Income Decile (8492-322438 pesos) 
# of HH Receiving 
Remittances 
Share of 
Remittance 
Receivers 
(%) 
Share of 
HH 
Receiving 
Remittances 
(%) 
 
# of HH 
Receiving 
Remittances 
Share of 
Remittance 
Receivers 
(%) 
Share of 
HH 
Receiving 
Remittances 
(%) 
 
# of HH 
Receiving 
Remittances 
Share of 
Remittance 
Receivers 
(%) 
Share of 
HH 
Receiving 
Remittances 
(%) 
 
# of HH 
Receiving 
Remittances 
Share of 
Remittance 
Receivers 
(%) 
Share of HH 
Receiving 
Remittances 
(%) 
127665 9.40 4.51   116591 8.59 4.12   86911 6.40 3.07   76520 5.63 2.7 
57486 9.38 8.93 
 
49965 8.15 7.79 
 
45377 7.40 7.37 
 
36869 6.01 9.91 
16346 7.99 2.41 
 
21001 10.27 2.94 
 
8422 4.12 1.25 
 
19319 9.45 2.67 
28643 10.16 2.89 
 
29467 10.45 3.02 
 
24431 8.66 2.44 
 
9841 3.49 0.95 
25190 9.75 4.89   16158 6.25 3.25   8681 3.36 1.62   10491 4.06 2.13 
8351 6.00 1.23 
 
8587 6.16 1.33 
 
10361 7.44 1.37 
 
9698 6.96 1.15 
7640 10.04 1.69 
 
16502 21.68 3.61 
 
0 0.00 0 
 
3565 4.68 0.89 
31422 9.76 4.06 
 
24667 7.66 3.05 
 
22021 6.84 2.91 
 
19469 6.05 2.52 
53910 10.67 8 
 
30802 6.10 4.72 
 
33290 6.59 5.36 
 
27768 5.50 4.64 
26342 8.35 10.4   36033 11.42 13.73   21239 6.73 8.98   16029 5.08 7.61 
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Table 3: Regional Groupings and Migration Intensity 
Traditional Region Northern Region Central Region South/Southeast Region 
State 
Migration 
Intensity State 
Migration 
Intensity State 
Migration 
Intensity State 
Migration 
Intensity 
Aguascalientes High Baja California Medium Distrito Federal Very Low Campeche Very Low 
Colima High Baja California Sur Very Low Hidalgo High Chiapas Very Low 
Durango High Coahuila Low México Low Guerrero High 
Guanajuato Very High Chihuahua Medium Morelos High Oaxaca High 
Jalisco High Nuevo Leon Very Low Puebla Medium Quintana Roo Very Low 
Michoacán Very High Sinaloa Medium Querétaro High Tabasco Very Low 
Nayarit Very High Sonora Medium Tlaxcala Medium Veracruz Medium 
San Luis 
Potosi High Tamaulipas Medium 
  
Yucatan Very Low 
Zacatecas Very High 
      Note:  Migration Intensity categories from CONAPO (2012). 
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Table 4a: OLS and Heckman ML Estimates of Income Equation, National and Regional; 
Dependent Variable: log(per capita hh income) 
   OLS 
National 
Heck 
National 
OLS 
Traditional 
Heck 
Traditional 
OLS 
Northern 
Heck 
Northern 
OLS 
Northern 
Heck 
Northern 
OLS  
SSE 
Heck  
SSE 
loginc           
hhsize -0.3135*** -0.3136*** -0.3016*** -0.3000*** -0.4054*** -0.4072*** -0.2954*** -0.2955*** -0.2735*** -0.2735*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
           
child05 0.0941*** 0.0940*** 0.1082*** 0.1070*** 0.1770*** 0.1781*** 0.0827*** 0.0827*** 0.0255*** 0.0254*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
           
male615 0.0288*** 0.0287*** 0.0644*** 0.0618*** 0.1330*** 0.1338*** -0.0272*** -0.0266*** -0.0155*** -0.0156*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
           
female615 0.0878*** 0.0877*** 0.1002*** 0.0984*** 0.1527*** 0.1542*** 0.0778*** 0.0778*** 0.0335*** 0.0334*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
           
male1665 0.0463*** 0.0463*** 0.0178*** 0.0167*** 0.1119*** 0.1136*** 0.0458*** 0.0456*** 0.0225*** 0.0226*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
           
female1665 0.0338*** 0.0339*** 0.0704*** 0.0686*** 0.1000*** 0.1022*** -0.0009 -0.0006 0.0022* 0.0022* 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
           
avged -0.0058*** -0.0058*** 0.0036*** 0.0041*** 0.0012*** 0.0008*** -0.0147*** -0.0147*** -0.0082*** -0.0082*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
           
age -0.0037*** -0.0037*** -0.0033*** -0.0036*** -0.0106*** -0.0107*** -0.0051*** -0.0051*** 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
           
agesq100 7.80e-7*** 7.84e-7*** 6.63e-7*** 6.86e-7*** 1.60e-6*** 1.62e-6*** 8.73e-7*** 8.79e-7*** 9.79e-8*** 9.89e-8*** 
 (7.82e-9) (7.84e-9) (1.73e-8) (1.73e-8) (1.58e-8) (1.58e-8) (1.35e-8) (1.36e-8) (1.78e-8) (1.68e-8) 
           
edyrs 0.0066*** 0.0066*** 0.0028*** 0.0024*** 0.0009*** 0.0011*** 0.0124*** 0.0124*** 0.0063*** 0.0063*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
           
hablaind 0.0341*** 0.0345*** 0.0784*** 0.0779*** 0.0430*** 0.0447*** 0.1082*** 0.1091*** -0.0478*** -0.0477*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
           
alfabe -0.0681*** -0.0676*** -0.0698*** -0.0700*** -0.0020 0.0056*** -0.1296*** -0.1284*** -0.0245*** -0.0245*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
           
constant 10.1006*** 10.0982*** 9.9570*** 9.9553*** 10.1235*** 10.2554*** 9.7759*** 9.7715*** 9.5618*** 9.4997*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0042) (0.0047) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0047) (0.0045) 
           
lambda  0.0258***  0.0828***  0.0907***  0.0686***  0.0060 
  0.0025  0.0043  0.0044  0.0034  0.0080 
N 26931171 26931171 5571206 5571206 6129160 6129160 8980569 8980569 6250236 6250236 
r2 0.2767  0.2179  0.2722  0.3014  0.2571  
F 2.396e+05  77601.3429  1.206e+05  2.153e+05  1.139e+05  
LR Test Chi2  92.82  203.52  306.02  278.06  0.54 
Prob(x>Chi2)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.4609 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4b: OLS and Heckman ML Estimates of Income Equation, by Migration Intensity; 
Dependent Variable: log(per capita hh income) 
 OLS V Low  
Intensity 
Heck V Low  
Intensity 
OLS Low 
Intensity 
Heck Low 
Intensity 
OLS Med. 
Intensity 
Heck Med. 
Intensity 
OLS High 
Intensity 
Heck High 
Intensity 
OLS V High 
Intensity 
Heck V High 
Intensity 
loginc           
hhsize -0.3820*** -0.3839*** -0.2427*** -0.2350*** -0.3164*** -0.3164*** -0.3157*** -0.3207*** -0.2478*** -0.2643*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
           
child05 0.1242*** 0.1231*** 0.0264*** 0.0215*** 0.1196*** 0.1196*** 0.0969*** 0.1076*** 0.0503*** 0.0531*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0019) 
           
male615 0.0578*** 0.0581*** -0.0414*** -0.0538*** 0.0345*** 0.0344*** 0.0637*** 0.0799*** -0.0228*** -0.0059*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0018) 
           
female615 0.1302*** 0.1321*** -0.0022 -0.0114*** 0.1013*** 0.1010*** 0.1126*** 0.1273*** 0.0314*** 0.0362*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0018) 
           
male1665 0.0884*** 0.0897*** -0.0077*** -0.0169*** 0.0527*** 0.0527*** 0.0458*** 0.0609*** 0.0275*** 0.0186*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0017) 
           
female1665 0.1050*** 0.1072*** -0.0489*** -0.0568*** 0.0110*** 0.0111*** 0.0611*** 0.0669*** -0.0031** 0.0162*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0017) 
           
avged 0.0025*** 0.0026*** -0.0015*** -0.0005*** -0.0215*** -0.0215*** -0.0011*** -0.0060*** -0.0021*** -0.0042*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
           
age -0.0064*** -0.0068*** 0.0010*** 0.0036*** -0.0046*** -0.0046*** -0.0029*** -0.0046*** -0.0051*** 0.0025*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
           
agesq100 1.03e-6*** 1.07e-6*** 1.76e-7*** -5.56e-8*** 1.04e-6*** 1.04e-6*** 6.45e-7*** 8.97e-7*** 7.07e-7*** 8.49e-9 
 (1.61e-8) (1.62e-8) (1.93e-8) (1.96e-8) (1.42e-8) (1.42e-8) (1.82e-8) (1.93e-8) (2.35e-8) (2.51e-8) 
           
edyrs 0.0025*** 0.0024*** -0.0027*** -0.0029*** 0.0196*** 0.0196*** 0.0004*** 0.0058*** 0.0099*** 0.0113*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
           
hablaind 0.0076*** 0.0109*** -0.1412*** -0.1225*** 0.0341*** 0.0344*** 0.1357*** 0.1163*** 0.0539*** 0.0722*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0024) 
           
alfabe -0.0701*** -0.0657*** -0.1616*** 0.1698*** -0.0179*** 0.0173*** -0.0462*** 0.0450*** -0.0880*** -0.1000*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0023) 
           
constant 10.2309*** 9.7853*** 9.8948*** 9.5180*** 9.6621*** 9.6259*** 10.0292*** 10.0525*** 9.2763*** 9.6170*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0052) (0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0048) (0.0055) (0.0067) (0.0070) 
           
lambda  0.1596***  -.5360***  0.0122***  -0.9190***  -0.7346*** 
  (0.0043)  0.0029  0.0052  0.0010  0.0021 
N 6518270 6518270 4255349 4255349 7548671 7548671 6083741 6083741 2525140 2525140 
r2 0.3374  0.2587  0.2721  0.2401  0.2292  
F 1.747e+05  1.142e+05  1.485e+05  91546.0917  50055.8506  
LR Test Chi2  1000.12  4664.35  4.92  92615.96  13480.80 
Prob(x>Chi2)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0265  0.0000  0.0000 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5: Heckman Selection Equation Results; Dependent Variable: Household Does Not 
Receive Remittances Indicator 
 National Traditional Northern Central SSE V Low Low Medium High V High 
hhsize -0.0078*** 0.0709*** -0.1482*** -0.0145*** -0.0087*** -0.1216*** -0.1831*** -0.0024 0.0362*** 0.0617*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0030) (0.0041) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0024) 
           
child05 -0.0196*** -0.0540*** 0.0891*** -0.0035 -0.0695*** -0.0403*** 0.1174*** -0.0108*** -0.0516*** -0.0056* 
 (0.0013) (0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0047) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0030) 
           
male615 -0.0264*** -0.1142*** 0.0764*** 0.0771*** -0.0610*** 0.0265*** 0.2877*** -0.0181*** -0.0724*** -0.0782*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0049) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0028) 
           
female615 -0.0205*** -0.0773*** 0.1121*** -0.0094*** -0.0561*** 0.1151*** 0.2143*** -0.0987*** -0.0642*** -0.0119*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0047) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0028) 
           
male1665 0.0096*** -0.0477*** 0.1295*** -0.0246*** 0.0399*** 0.0827*** 0.1834*** 0.0067*** -0.0790*** 0.0501*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0043) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0026) 
           
female1665 0.0186*** -0.0772*** 0.1765*** 0.0352*** 0.0229*** 0.1440*** 0.1740*** 0.0405*** -0.0161*** -0.0667*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0042) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0026) 
           
avged 0.0028*** 0.0217*** -0.0248*** 0.0014*** -0.0021*** 0.0092*** -0.0244*** -0.0241*** 0.0239*** -0.0020*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
           
age -0.0121*** -0.0146*** -0.0112*** -0.0079*** -0.0120*** -0.0263*** -0.0607*** 0.0007* 0.0040*** -0.0378*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
           
agesq100 1.11e-6*** 1.06e-6*** 1.34e-6*** 7.59e-7*** 1.26e-6*** 2.57e-6*** 5.60e-6*** 2.87e-7*** -6.29e-7*** 3.61e-6*** 
 (1.79e-8) (2.88e-8) (4.34e-8) (3.66e-8) (4.12e-8) (5.26e-8) (7.83e-8) (3.50e-8) (2.92e-8) (4.23e-8) 
           
edyrs -0.0065*** -0.0200*** 0.0158*** -0.0021*** -0.0064*** -0.0059*** 0.0105*** 0.0139*** -0.0194*** -0.0008** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004) 
           
hablaind 0.0901*** -0.0164*** 0.1355*** 0.0854*** 0.1334*** 0.1683*** -0.2153*** 0.1564*** 0.1264*** -0.1305*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0041) (0.0058) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0038) 
           
alfabe 0.1201*** -0.0154*** 0.4780*** 0.1061*** -0.0084** 0.2151*** 0.0700*** 0.2690*** -0.0762*** 0.0822*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0039) (0.0054) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0034) 
           
assets -0.0490*** -0.0893*** -0.1603*** -0.0254*** 0.0108*** -0.1566*** -0.2716*** 0.0239*** -0.0613*** 0.0557*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0031) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0037) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0021) 
           
remshrco -0.0005*** 0.0006*** 0.0201*** -0.0168*** -0.0027*** -0.0386*** -0.0556*** -0.0072*** 0.0069*** -0.0100*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
           
remshrxassets 0.0067*** 0.0119*** 0.0081*** -0.0049*** 0.0027*** 0.0278*** 0.0345*** -0.0035*** -0.0003** 0.0070*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
           
constant 1.7939*** 1.9528*** 2.4134*** 1.9249*** 2.5013*** 2.6064*** 3.8277*** 1.6157*** 1.5192*** 2.0308*** 
 (0.0059) (0.0086) (0.0151) (0.0098) (0.0119) (0.0140) (0.0188) (0.0099) (0.0083) (0.0116) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6a: Observed Poverty Rates: Total Income vs. Non-Remittance Income Only 
    International Extreme Poverty Line     International Poverty Line     National Extreme Poverty Line (Rural)   
    $1.25 per day (USD PPP)     $2.00 per day (USD PPP)                       MX$ 697.93 per month   
  
 
Observed 
Poverty 
Rate 
Poverty Rate 
w/o 
Remittances Difference % Change 
 
Observed  
Poverty 
Rate 
Poverty Rate 
w/o 
Remittances Difference % Change 
Observed  
Poverty 
Rate 
Poverty Rate 
w/o Remittances Difference   % Change 
National 
 
0.0462 0.0542 -0.0080 -14.69 
 
0.0933 0.1042 -0.0109 -10.46 
 
0.1640 0.1735189 -0.0095 -5.47 
Traditional Region  
 
0.0484 0.0644 -0.0160 -24.83 
 
0.0908 0.1132 -0.0224 -19.79 
 
0.1689 0.1857529 -0.0168 -9.07 
Northern Region 
 
0.0300 0.0791 -0.0491 -62.11 
 
0.0688 0.0791 -0.0103 -13.02 
 
0.1285 0.1369752 -0.0085 -6.21 
Central Region 
 
0.0370 0.0417 -0.0047 -11.24 
 
0.0719 0.0784 -0.0065 -8.29 
 
0.1334 0.1400616 -0.0067 -4.78 
SSE Region 
 
0.0730 0.0802 -0.0072 -8.92 
 
0.1501 0.1566 -0.0065 -4.15 
 
0.2376 0.2450027 -0.0074 -3.04 
Very Low Intensity 
 
0.0422 0.0458 -0.0036 -7.93 
 
0.0904 0.0968 -0.0064 -6.61 
 
0.1532 0.1588738 -0.0057 -3.59 
Low Intensity 
 
0.0355 0.0381 -0.0026 -6.70 
 
0.0739 0.077 -0.0031 -4.03 
 
0.1352 0.1376747 -0.0025 -1.82 
Average Intensity 
 
0.0416 0.0487 -0.0071 -14.63 
 
0.0888 0.099 -0.0102 -10.30 
 
0.1570 0.1681226 -0.0111 -6.61 
High Intensity 
 
0.0590 0.072 -0.0130 -18.08 
 
0.1127 0.1265 -0.0138 -10.91 
 
0.1928 0.2045437 -0.0117 -5.74 
Very High Intensity 
 
0.0549 0.0725 -0.0176 -24.26 
 
0.0965 0.1255 -0.0290 -23.11 
 
0.1852 0.2055193 -0.0204 -9.91 
                                
 
 
Table 6b: Observed Poverty Rates: Total Income vs. Non-Remittance Income Only 
    National Extreme Poverty Line (Urban) 
  
National Poverty Line (Rural) 
  
National Poverty Line (Urban)   
    MX$ 990.77 per month     MX$ 1348.62 per month     MX$ 2140.05 per month   
  
 
Observed 
Poverty 
Rate 
Poverty Rate 
w/o Remittances Difference % Change 
 
Observed  
Poverty 
Rate 
Poverty Rate 
w/o Remittances Difference % Change 
Observed  
Poverty 
Rate 
Poverty Rate 
w/o Remittances Difference   % Change 
National 
 
0.2485 0.2583 -0.0098 -3.80 
 
0.3528 0.3617 -0.0089 -2.47 
 
0.5198 0.5260 -0.0062 -1.18 
Traditional Region  
 
0.2542 0.2725 -0.0183 -6.71 
 
0.3536 0.3710 -0.0174 -4.68 
 
0.5260 0.5372 -0.0112 -2.09 
Northern Region 
 
0.2011 0.2103 -0.0091 -4.33 
 
0.2954 0.3028 -0.0074 -2.46 
 
0.4631 0.4681 -0.0050 -1.07 
Central Region 
 
0.2148 0.2201 -0.0052 -2.38 
 
0.3182 0.3222 -0.0040 -1.24 
 
0.4872 0.4913 -0.0040 -0.82 
SSE Region 
 
0.3367 0.3458 -0.0091 -2.63 
 
0.4569 0.4663 -0.0094 -2.02 
 
0.6154 0.6212 -0.0058 -0.93 
Very Low Intensity 
 
0.2282 0.2347 -0.0065 -2.78 
 
0.3248 0.3290 -0.0042 -1.28 
 
0.4818 0.4840 -0.0022 -0.45 
Low Intensity 
 
0.2260 0.2267 -0.0007 -0.32 
 
0.3300 0.3299 0.0001 0.04 
 
0.5119 0.5127 -0.0009 -0.17 
Average Intensity 
 
0.2410 0.2522 -0.0111 -4.42 
 
0.3502 0.3617 -0.0115 -3.17 
 
0.5125 0.5197 -0.0072 -1.39 
High Intensity 
 
0.2769 0.2891 -0.0122 -4.22 
 
0.3773 0.3908 -0.0135 -3.46 
 
0.5426 0.5528 -0.0102 -1.85 
Very High Intensity 
 
0.2834 0.3070 -0.0237 -7.71 
 
0.4020 0.4194 -0.0174 -4.15 
 
0.5869 0.6003 -0.0134 -2.23 
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Table 7a: Estimated Changes in Poverty Rates: Observed Income vs. Imputed Income 
    International Extreme Poverty Line     International Poverty Line     National Extreme Poverty Line (Rural)   
    $1.25 per day (USD PPP)     $2.00 per day (USD PPP)                         MX$ 697.93 per month   
  
 
Observed 
Poverty 
Rate 
Estimated  
Poverty Rate 
w/o Remittances Difference % Change 
 
Observed  
Poverty 
Rate 
Estimated  
Poverty Rate 
w/o Remittances Difference % Change 
Observed  
Poverty 
Rate 
Estimated  
Poverty Rate 
w/o Remittances Difference   % Change 
National 
 
0.0462 0.0535 -0.0073 -13.57 
 
0.0933 0.1096 -0.0163 -14.85 
 
0.1640 0.1817 -0.0177 -9.73 
  
  (.0533863    .0536074) 
 
  
 
  (.1094215    .1097255) 
 
  
 
  (.1815288      .18191) 
 
  
Traditional Region  
 
0.0484 0.0507 -0.0023 -4.45 
 
0.0908 0.1074 -0.0166 -15.42 
 
0.1689 0.1817 -0.0128 -7.04 
   
(.0504247    .0509086) 
    
(.1070235    .1076951) 
    
(.1812841    .1821262) 
  Northern Region 
 
0.0300 0.0393 -0.0093 -23.67 
 
0.0688 0.0855 -0.0167 -19.54 
 
0.1285 0.1485 -0.0201 -13.51 
   
(.0390441    .0394856) 
    
(.0851896    .0858291) 
    
(.1481459    .1489391) 
  Central Region 
 
0.0370 0.0436 -0.0066 -15.11 
 
0.0719 0.0918 -0.0199 -21.72 
 
0.1334 0.1562 -0.0228 -14.60 
   
(.0434443    .0437583) 
    
(.0916237     .092076) 
    
(.1558717    .1564537) 
  SSE Region 
 
0.0730 0.0774 -0.0044 -5.68 
 
0.1501 0.1509 -0.0008 -0.53 
 
0.2376 0.2400 -0.0025 -1.03 
  
  (.0771639    .0777304) 
 
  
 
  (.1505391    .1512686) 
 
  
 
  (.2396031    .2404596) 
 
  
Very Low Intensity 
 
0.0422 0.0518 -0.0097 -18.65 
 
0.0904 0.1016 -0.0112 -11.05 
 
0.1532 0.1656 -0.0124 -7.50 
   
(.0516528     .052017) 
    
(.1013747    .1018764) 
    
(.1652874    .1658909) 
  Low Intensity 
 
0.0355 0.0444 -0.0088 -19.91 
 
0.0739 0.0953 -0.0214 -22.42 
 
0.1352 0.1638 -0.0286 -17.46 
   
(.0441511    .0446208) 
    
(.0949157    .0955934) 
    
(.1633372    .1641701) 
  Average Intensity 
 
0.0416 0.0498 -0.0082 -16.49 
 
0.0888 0.1046 -0.0158 -15.09 
 
0.1570 0.1764 -0.0194 -11.00 
   
(.0495597    .0500119) 
    
(.1042577    .1049167) 
    
(.1759994    .1768225) 
  High Intensity 
 
0.0590 0.0552 0.0038 6.90 
 
0.1127 0.1161 -0.0034 -2.91 
 
0.1928 0.1948 -0.0020 -1.00 
   
(.0549141    .0554331) 
    
(.1157193     .116441) 
    
(.1943064    .1951976) 
  Very High Intensity 
 
0.0549 0.0617 -0.0067 -10.95 
 
0.0965 0.1268 -0.0303 -23.90 
 
0.1852 0.2090 -0.0239 -11.41 
   
(.0613459    .0619727) 
    
(.1263602     .127242) 
    
(.2084861    .2095375) 
  Note: 95% confidence intervals in parentheses 
 
 
Table 7b: Estimated Changes in Poverty Rates: Observed Income vs. Imputed Income 
    National Extreme Poverty Line (Urban) 
  
National Poverty Line (Rural) 
  
National Poverty Line (Urban)   
    MX$ 990.77 per month     MX$ 1348.62 per month     MX$ 2140.05 per month   
  
 
Observed 
Poverty 
Rate 
Estimated 
Poverty Rate 
w/o Remittances Difference % Change 
 
Observed  
Poverty 
Rate 
Estimated 
Poverty Rate 
w/o Remittances Difference % Change 
Observed  
Poverty 
Rate 
Estimated  
Poverty Rate 
w/o Remittances Difference   % Change 
National 
 
0.2485 0.2699 -0.0214 -7.94 
 
0.3528 0.3629 -0.0101 -2.78 
 
0.5198 0.5179 0.0019 0.37 
   
(.269686    .2701205) 
 
  
  
(.3626334    .3630918) 
 
  
  
(.5177006    .5181818) 
 
  
Traditional Region  
 
0.2542 0.2735 -0.0193 -7.05 
 
0.3536 0.3708 -0.0172 -4.63 
 
0.5260 0.5316 -0.0056 -1.05 
   
(.2730372    .2740015) 
    
(.3702619    .3713184) 
    
(.5310185    .5321286) 
  Northern Region 
 
0.2011 0.2291 -0.0280 -12.20 
 
0.2954 0.3176 -0.0223 -7.01 
 
0.4631 0.4717 -0.0087 -1.84 
   
(.2286409    .2295799) 
    
(.317116    .3181216) 
    
(.4711696    .4722617) 
  Central Region 
 
0.2148 0.2375 -0.0227 -9.54 
 
0.3182 0.3259 -0.0078 -2.38 
 
0.4872 0.4795 0.0078 1.62 
   
(.2371549    .2378262) 
    
(.325547    .3262849) 
    
(.4791018    .4798621) 
  SSE Region 
 
0.3367 0.3428 -0.0061 -1.78 
 
0.4569 0.4451 0.0118 2.64 
 
0.6154 0.6049 0.0105 1.74 
   
(.3423334    .3432813) 
 
  
  
(.444629    .4456237) 
 
  
  
(.6043775    .6053657) 
 
  
Very Low Intensity 
 
0.2282 0.2448 -0.0165 -6.76 
 
0.3248 0.3294 -0.0046 -1.41 
 
0.4818 0.4756 0.0062 1.30 
   
(.2443812    .2451352) 
    
(.3290025     .329818) 
    
(.4751856    .4760519) 
  Low Intensity 
 
0.2260 0.2494 -0.0234 -9.38 
 
0.3300 0.3420 -0.0119 -3.49 
 
0.5119 0.4997 0.0122 2.44 
   
(.2489115    .2498751) 
    
(.3414239    .3425323) 
    
(.4990865     .500262) 
  Average Intensity 
 
0.2410 0.2651 -0.0240 -9.06 
 
0.3502 0.3591 -0.0088 -2.46 
 
0.5125 0.5169 -0.0043 -0.84 
   
(.2645802    .2655295) 
    
(.3585643    .3595471) 
    
(.5163466    .5173697) 
  High Intensity 
 
0.2769 0.2904 -0.0135 -4.65 
 
0.3773 0.3899 -0.0126 -3.23 
 
0.5426 0.5527 -0.0101 -1.83 
   
(.2899454    .2909408) 
    
(.3893424       .3904) 
    
(.5521683    .5532648) 
  Very High Intensity 
 
0.2834 0.3076 -0.0243 -7.89 
 
0.4020 0.4099 -0.0079 -1.92 
 
0.5869 0.5742 0.0127 2.22 
   
(.3070645    .3082172) 
    
(.4092353    .4104865) 
    
(.5735414    .5748202) 
  
Note: 95% confidence intervals in parentheses 
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